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Abstract 8 
The objective of this study is to explore the current strategies available to monitor and detect the 9 
economically and criminally motivated adulteration of food, identifying their strengths and 10 
weaknesses and recommend new approaches and policies to strengthen future capabilities to 11 
counter adulteration in a globalized food environment.  There are many techniques used to detect 12 
the presence of adulterants, however this approach relies on the adulterant or means of substitution 13 
being “known” and no food item can ever be declared truly free of adulteration on that basis. 14 
Further techniques will verify the provenance claims made about a food product e.g. breed, variety 15 
etc.as well as techniques to identify original geographic location of food production. These consider 16 
wholeness, or not, of a food item and do not need to necessarily identify the actual adulterant. The 17 
conceptual framework developed in this research focuses on the process of predicting, detecting and 18 
reacting to economically and criminally motivated food adulteration.  19 
 20 
Introduction 21 
Food adulteration is an age-old problem especially where there is a challenge between the physical 22 
availability of, and the market demand for, a food item. This is further impacted if there is 23 
juxtaposition between the cost of production, say of meat or meat-based products, and the price the 24 
supply chain customer (at a supplier/customer interface) or the end user is prepared to pay for the 25 
product. The objective of this study is to explore the current strategies available to monitor and 26 
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detect the economically and criminally motivated adulteration of food, identifying their strengths 27 
and weaknesses and recommend new approaches and policies to strengthen future capabilities to 28 
counter adulteration in a globalized food environment.  This paper begins by discussing the context 29 
of economically and criminally motivated food adulteration and then reviews the evolving 30 
techniques used to detect the presence of known adulterants, to identify product integrity, or 31 
otherwise, of foodstuffs as well as techniques to identify original geographic location of food 32 
production. A conceptual framework is developed and then its application discussed. 33 
Whilst there is much focus in the literature, quite rightly, on the definitions of food safety and the 34 
agents that render food unsafe there is less emphasis on the nature of product integrity or 35 
wholeness. Adapting the term for “wholeness” in the Collins Dictionary (2013), the term product 36 
integrity can be described as the inherent quality of containing all the component parts necessary to 37 
form a total; i.e. completeness. Product integrity in this context could be further described as 38 
meeting the agreed specification that has been laid down in terms of expressing the total 39 
completeness of the item that is “undiminished, without removal of part” (Adapted from Sykes 40 
1976). By inference, failure to meet this specification indicates, to the limits of the testing methods, 41 
that a food may have been contaminated, have undergone substitution or has been adulterated. This 42 
approach does not require the party undertaking the testing to identify the specific contaminant 43 
rather just to identify that the specification of integrity for that commodity has not been met. As 44 
analytical techniques become more accurate the depth of the specification of “what described 45 
integrity” for a given food item will change and develop as discussed later in this paper. Defra 46 
(2013) states that food standards legislation sets out specific requirements for the labelling, 47 
composition and, in some cases, safety parameters for specific high value foodstuffs that are 48 
potentially at risk of being misleadingly substituted with lower quality alternatives. This is as 49 
opposed to food safety that addresses food that is injurious to health (Food Safety Act, 1990). In 50 
their Food Law Enforcement Plan 2010/2011, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (2010: 3) 51 
states that “standards inspections are seen as a second priority” to that of food hygiene and as a 52 
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result, far less sampling for composition, labelling, claims, allergens, etc. is done. It is food 53 
standards that this research particularly focuses on and dependent on the adulterant or substitution 54 
concerned this may, or may not, also be a food safety problem. 55 
 56 
Adulteration in a globalized food environment 57 
It has been suggested that global anti-counterfeiting activities for the food and drug sector are 58 
projected to be worth $79.3 billion by 2014 (Li, 2013). In order to outline the context of this 59 
statistic this section compares and contrasts a number of food adulteration and fraud cases in both 60 
developed and developing countries.  61 
United Kingdom / European Union 62 
Scally (2013) argues that the lengthening of food supply chains, accompanied by the increased 63 
industrialization of the food business, has had a profound effect on the food culture of developed 64 
countries. Indeed he proposes that modern food processing has created the opportunity to practice 65 
consumer fraud on a truly massive and international scale. The fraud can be undertaken in one 66 
country and then the actual impact can be in countries far removed from the perpetrators especially 67 
so as the globalization and consolidation of food procurement increases further (Manning et al. 68 
2005). Therefore, it is possible to contaminate food in a country where regulatory and market 69 
controls are limited and cause major human health consequences and economic disruption in 70 
another where on the surface such controls appear stringent.  71 
Food adulteration can be described as the actions that are taken to add or adjust a food item or 72 
composite food product by the use of extraneous, substandard, or inferior ingredients. Food fraud 73 
may be carried out intentionally for economic gain, with the associated actions undertaken to avoid 74 
detection by regulatory bodies or consumers (Grundy et al. 2012). Economically motivated 75 
adulteration (EMA) has been described as “The fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a 76 
substance in a product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing 77 
the cost of its production, i.e. for economic gain.” (Spink and Moyer, 2011:32). Economically and 78 
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criminally motivated food adulteration is nothing new. Accum (1820) identified that at that time 79 
that there had been a range of successful prosecutions in the United Kingdom (UK) for 80 
counterfeiting and adulteration of tea, coffee, bread, beer, and pepper. These were both a concern 81 
with regard to food safety as well as being of a food standards issue. Accum determined that 82 
adulteration was a widespread practice involving a number of food items and also exposed the 83 
culinary fraud practices in London and detailed how bakers cut their flour with alum, chalk, plaster 84 
and sawdust to make them heavier. Other fraud cases at the time involved brewers adding bitter 85 
substances such as strychnine to beer and the use of lead, copper or mercury salts to make bright 86 
coloured sweets and jellies.  87 
In April 2013, the European Commission reported on testing that had been carried out in the wake 88 
of concern over meat product adulteration (EC, 2013). The results indicated that, for the products 89 
tested for the presence of horse DNA (n=4144), 4.7% revealed positive traces of horse DNA. For 90 
the products tested for the presence of phenylbutazone (n=3115) 0.51% showed positive traces of 91 
the drug. In addition, Member States (MS) reported tests performed by food business operators 92 
(producers, processors and distributors; n=7951) for the presence of horse DNA; 1.38% had horse 93 
DNA present.  The UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) also identified products labelled as “Halal” 94 
that contained pork (FSA, 2013). Beef adulteration in Europe highlights not only the continued 95 
problem with food fraud, but also the potential for unwitting cross-contamination at “micro levels” 96 
during standard meat processing activities where multi species meats are processed/prepared in the 97 
same vicinity and using the same equipment. This means that products (that would have previously 98 
been declared as “free from” or “whole” in terms of being suitable for a certain cultural or religious 99 
group) as analytical methods develop, and as limits of detection reduce, may not indeed be found to 100 
meet that specification. The discrepancy may be at the level of parts per million (ppm) or parts per 101 
billion (ppb) but this may not be acceptable to consumers e.g. in terms of pesticide residues or the 102 
presence of DNA from other animal species. This creates a current and future challenge that the 103 
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industry will need to address both in practical terms in trying to reduce these minimal levels further 104 
and also with meeting cultural expectations. 105 
 106 
United States 107 
There is much work from the United States (US) that focuses on food fraud and food adulteration 108 
(Everstine et al., 2013; Spink and Moyer 2013; Moore et al., 2012; Spink and Moyer 2011) As an 109 
example of the types of incidents identified, a 2012 report on food fraud in US restaurants and retail 110 
outlets (Warner et al. 2012) concluded that 58% of the eighty-one retail outlets sampled, sold 111 
mislabeled fish with small markets having a higher incidence of fraud (40%) than national chain 112 
grocery stores (12%). Furthermore, all of the sushi bars (n=16) tested sold mislabeled fish and 94% 113 
of the “white tuna” tested was not tuna at all. As previously discussed this type of adulteration 114 
could be caused for a variety of reasons e.g. by accidental means due to a failure in either process or 115 
supply chain controls or as a result of premeditated criminal activity.  116 
 117 
India 118 
One of the key problems in India is the intentional contamination of food with look-alike 119 
substances. The look-alike substances were substituted in items like incidents of brick powder in 120 
red chillies, lead chromate in turmeric and vegetable oil contamination with milk fat (Shukla et al., 121 
2014). A 2011 survey in India of adulteration in liquid milk found that 68% of the randomly 122 
collected samples tested (n=1791) were non-conforming (FSSAI, 2011). In some states the level of 123 
non-compliance was 100%. The non-conformity of samples in rural areas was found to be 31% of 124 
which 81% were loose (unpacked) samples. In urban areas 69% of samples were non-conforming 125 
(67% loose samples). Detergent was found (8%); skimmed milk powder (45%) and glucose (27%) 126 
of the samples. In seven Indian states all samples taken were found to be impure. This demonstrates 127 
the level of milk adulteration being practiced in India. The biggest dairy food fraud incident to date 128 
using melamine, that also had serious implications for public health, was in China. 129 
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 130 
China 131 
Melamine is rich in nitrogen and contains 67% nitrogen per mass unit (Merck Research 132 
Laboratories, 2001). Due to the high nitrogen content, melamine was added, as an adulterant, to 133 
food commodities such as milk and wheat gluten to “increase” the perceived protein content and 134 
avoided detection as milk was tested for protein using a method based on total nitrogen content 135 
(Schoder, 2010). In 2006 dairy production in China faced rising feed prices so 40% of dairy farmers 136 
were losing money and a further 30% were just breaking (Jia et al. 2012). Whilst dairy processing 137 
firms were demanding increased milk supply as a result of consumer demand some farmers were 138 
culling their herds due to the lack of profitability. This aggravated the already tight milk supply in 139 
China. In early 2007 the new shortage of milk supplies threatened to push up the price of milk 140 
products (Jia et al. 2012). The use of protein powders in milk was prohibited; such powders could 141 
be sourced from ground animals‟ parts, soy and other food sources. Later, manufacturers of plastics 142 
started seeing a demand for melamine, but there was no connection made between the two 143 
supposedly separate incidents.  144 
An increased incidence of kidney stones and renal failure among infants was identified in China in 145 
December 2007 and Sanlu Customer Service Department received consumer complaints about their 146 
products (Xiaojing, 2011). [Concurrently there was a pet food recall for melamine contamination of 147 
pet food ingredients in the US due to contamination of wheat gluten.] In June 2008 complaints 148 
appeared on the State Council Administration for quality, supervision, inspection and quarantine 149 
(AQSIQ) website. Official inspectors then assessed the commodities produced by Sanlu, and once 150 
adulteration was identified all batches produced up to December 2007 were recalled. In August 151 
2008 melamine was reported as being detected in 15 out of 16 lots tested, but a recall was not 152 
instigated until the government ordered Sanlu to stop production and distribution of product in 153 
September 2008 (Xiaojing, 2011). In that month it was announced that 59 infants had developed 154 
kidney stones and one child had died. In September 2008, the WHO (2008) identified that there had 155 
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been 6240 cases of kidney stones in China with three deaths. The WHO reported that at least 22 156 
dairy manufacturers across China were found to have melamine in some of their products (the 157 
levels varied between 0.09mg/kg and 2.560 mg/kg). Gossner et. al. (2009) determined that kidney 158 
and urinary tract effects, including kidney stones, affected about 300,000 Chinese infants and young 159 
children, with six reported deaths.  160 
Further forty-seven countries received the melamine-contaminated products and sixty-eight 161 
countries banned or recalled foods suspected of containing melamine (Gossner et. al. 2009 citing 162 
Bhalla et al. 2009). Food fraud, as in this example, can occur in commercial circumstances when 163 
there is an issue with the bridging of the supply of and demand for a food commodity. Substitution 164 
can arise as a result of an illegal activity to fill the “supply gap” or to meet the cost structure at the 165 
stages of the food supply chain where there is a reticence or inability for increasing operational 166 
costs to be passed through to the end consumer. 167 
As a result of this incident, the Chinese government was forced to react to ensure the safety and 168 
quality of Chinese food products through the implementation of food safety laws, increasing 169 
penalties for illegal practice and by instituting a system of risk evaluation that included monitoring 170 
500,000 companies (Ramzy, 2009). It should be stressed that within the diverse and complex global 171 
food supply chains there are constraints to addressing food safety, food standards and corruption at 172 
local, national and international levels. Furthermore, maintaining confidence in a food supply chain 173 
in order to ensure continued economic growth is not an issue localized only to China. The Chinese 174 
case study merely serves as an example of the challenges presented with regard to control of food 175 
adulteration. As Accum (1820) identified such activities were evident in a developing UK food 176 
culture and the examples given in this paper highlight they continue to be prevalent today. 177 
Although the use of melamine in China as a food adulterant gained attention from 2007, 178 
adulteration continues to be a problem with further arrests and prosecutions in China in 2011 179 
(Coghlan, 2011). Melamine contamination has also been identified in milk purchased in twelve out 180 
of fourteen samples from markets in Iran (Hassani et al. 2013). These examples highlight the 181 
 8 
continued use of this adulterant and why routine product testing for melamine is so critical to verify 182 
continued product compliance and to seek to prevent contaminated materials from being used in the 183 
food supply chain and/or consumed. However, often food fraud is undertaken with the full 184 
knowledge and understanding of the systems of surveillance and control and the analytical tests that 185 
are currently used at borders and within countries.   The constituents used for emerging and re-186 
emerging food fraud are targeted on this basis either for the reason that they are not currently 187 
routinely tested for in surveillance and verification testing and food import control protocols or that 188 
the adulterant used will pass existing analytical tests without identification.  189 
 190 
Economically motivated adulteration 191 
Contamination maybe accidental or unintentional particularly when farmers or processors are 192 
unaware of that a set of circumstances they put in place could potentially lead to contamination of 193 
food. However, when food adulteration becomes intentional, this is when criminal and 194 
economically driven factors can come into play. Practices of deliberate contamination of food and 195 
drug ingredients may be widespread and also avoid detection in poorly regulated markets where 196 
surveillance is minimal. For example, in China there are over 500,000 food processing businesses 197 
and slim profit margins drove some owners to cut cost by substituting food with cheaper ingredients 198 
(Zach et al. 2012). Substitution may include diluting infant formula (Xiu and Klein 2010), using 199 
diethylene glycol as a substitute for glycerin (FDA 2008), using illegal red dyes in duck eggs (Du 200 
and Sun, 2007) and relabeling of seafood products (D‟Amico et al. 2014). If deliberate 201 
contamination is motivated by financial gain, the practices are likely to be concealed and if 202 
undiscovered, to recur (Brown and Brown 2010). 203 
Due to their high market value, meat products are often targets for species substitution and 204 
adulteration (Cawthorn et al. 2013). A study undertaken in South Africa on processed meat 205 
products (n=139) identified that 68% of samples contained species that were not declared on the 206 
product labelling, with the incidence being highest in sausages, burger patties and deli meats i.e. 207 
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processed foods rather than carcass meats. Soya and gluten were identified as undeclared plant 208 
proteins in a large number of samples (28%), whilst pork (37%) and chicken (23%) were the most 209 
commonly detected animal species. Cawthorn et al. (2013) also reported that unconventional 210 
species such as donkey, goat and water buffalo were discovered as species that had been substituted 211 
for another origin. They conclude that mislabeling of processed meats is commonplace in South 212 
Africa and this not only violates food labeling regulations, but also poses economic, religious, 213 
ethical and health impacts.  214 
In the EU, syndicates took advantage of the price-support structure of the European Common 215 
Agricultural Policy for financial gain. For example, butter produced within the EU receives a 216 
subsidy payment because of lower market prices when exported to a „third‟ (non-EU country). Then 217 
the same consignment of butter was re-labeled as produce of the third country before being re-218 
imported back into the EU. The re-labeled butter was subjected to income tax at a lower rate than 219 
the original subsidy paid on the export. Hence, by re-labeling the origin of the butter, syndicates 220 
were able to make illegal profit of up to £30,000 per 25,000 kg consignment of butter (Kelly et al. 221 
2005). Spink and Moyer (2011) identified seven types of food fraud (Table 1) namely adulteration, 222 
counterfeit product, diversion of products outside of intended markets, over-run, simulation, 223 
tampering and theft. Each type of food fraud generates different potential levels of monetary gains 224 
and the degree of gain is dependent on how well the „fraud‟ has been carried out and if detection of 225 
the crime occurs. For example, when white sturgeon caviar is substituted with beluga caviar, 226 
consumers pay five times more than they should for the product (Cohen 1997). 227 
 228 
Take in Table1 229 
 230 
Everstine et al. (2013) argue that EMA incidents reveal voids in quality assurance testing 231 
methodologies that can be exploited for intentional harm.  Indeed gaps in traceability, quality 232 
assurance programmes or interfaces between different certification schemes will be exploited where 233 
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they occur by some individuals for economic benefit. Everstine et al. (2013) suggest in their study 234 
that 137 documented and distinct EMA incidents had been identified. The food product categories 235 
ranged from protein products to spices and sweeteners. Moore et al. (2012) determine that whilst 236 
food ingredient fraud and EMA are emerging risks, a comprehensive database about known 237 
problematic ingredients and detection methods did not exist until 2012 when the USP Food Fraud 238 
Database was established. The proliferation of potential adulterants demonstrates that any 239 
“screening based” approach needs to be diverse and wide reaching in its scope. Product testing can 240 
be costly and introduce time delays, especially at border inspection points, in a food supply chain 241 
that is both highly price sensitive and continuously driving towards a just in time approach to 242 
minimize the costs of holding/storing stock.  Organizations will vary in the extent to which they 243 
use/undertake risk-benefit evaluations such as hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) for 244 
food safety and a threat or vulnerability analysis critical control point (TACCP or VACCP) 245 
assessment to determine the risk of vulnerability to fraud or bioterrorism incidents. These 246 
approaches identify the process controls and product testing that is deemed necessary to minimize 247 
risk to the organization, their customers and the final consumer (FDA, 2013a).  248 
The WTO/SPS agreement (WHO, 1997) introduced the term "appropriate level of sanitary or 249 
phytosanitary protection" (ALOP) i.e. the level of protection deemed appropriate by a Country or 250 
Member State establishing a Sanitary and/or Phytosanitary (SPS) measure to protect human, animal 251 
or plant life or health within its borders. By setting a food safety objective (FSO), competent 252 
authorities can determine a risk-based limit that should be achieved operationally within the food 253 
chain, while providing flexibility for different production, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, 254 
and preparation approaches (CAC, 2007). Furthermore, a performance objective (PO) can be 255 
determined i.e. the maximum frequency and/or concentration of a food safety hazard in a food at a 256 
specified step in the food chain before the time of consumption that provides or contributes to an 257 
FSO or ALOP (CAC, 2011). However, the FSO and PO can only be determined if the food safety 258 
hazard or contaminant is “known” and there has been a scientific risk-based determination of the 259 
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acceptable level of the hazard within a food. In the case of “unknown unknowns” this risk 260 
assessment approach falls down. By its nature EMA is often within this category as the food 261 
adulteration or substitution has the potential to cause harm if ingested. In instances of food fraud 262 
only the fraudsters know how the food has been manipulated and to what extent the substitution is a 263 
labelling or a food safety issue and also how it was introduced into the food supply chain. However, 264 
the fraudsters may neither care nor have the knowledge, the expertise, or the resources to determine 265 
if the substitution or manipulation undertaken poses any acute or chronic risk to consumers. Hence, 266 
the public health risks of adulterated food are often unknown until it is too late (Moore et al. 2012). 267 
Spink and Moyer (2011) also state that the public health risks from adulterated food are more risky 268 
than traditional food safety threats because the contaminants are often unconventional. There are a 269 
non-exhaustive number of potential EMA contaminants and a risk-based approach requires a high 270 
degree of knowledge or expert opinion in order to appropriately quantify the level of risk. However 271 
such expert knowledge will be lacking or non-existent with some EMA, since this is the very reason 272 
why they were chosen in the first place. Economic influences will create a situation where 273 
alternative ingredients or materials are sought by supply chain partners that are “cheaper” than 274 
standard ingredients and can go largely undetected in the current product monitoring and 275 
verification regimes. Food analysis is often at the accuracy level of ppm or ppb and this has led to 276 
the development of techniques often described as food forensics. This particular field will need to 277 
develop strongly in order to meet the global challenges of food fraud. 278 
 279 
Food forensics 280 
The use of nonspecific analytical tests in routine product testing is one of the risk factor for the 281 
incidence of EMA (Everstine et al. 2013).  The wide range of substances that can be used in food 282 
fraud coupled with the impossibility to analyse them all, make conventional testing unsuitable for 283 
food adulteration problems. In order to cover the widest range of adulterants usually requires 284 
sophisticated analytical equipment such as mass spectrometry (Di Stefano et al. 2012). It could be 285 
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argued that the melamine adulteration incident occurred because the analytical method used to 286 
determine protein content was non-specific and thus by adulteration a “false” reading could be 287 
obtained. Kjedahl or combustion (Dumas) method measures the protein content based on total 288 
nitrogen content and do not differentiate between protein nitrogen or non-protein nitrogen (Moore 289 
et al. 2010).  As a result of this, individuals took advantage of their „misused‟ food chemistry 290 
knowledge to enhance the determined level of the protein content of milk, knowing that the tests 291 
were of non-specific nitrogen tests.  292 
The US Pharmacopeia (2012) advocates a proactive approach i.e. the testing of food ingredients for 293 
authenticity rather than testing for the absence of specific adulterants (Moore et al. 2012). Moore et 294 
al. (2012) reviewed and collected over 1000 records of food frauds and analytical methods 295 
published in the USP Food Fraud Database. The database is useful to identify trends and 296 
developments and provide stakeholders with information on methods to detect food frauds. 297 
According to Primrose et al. (2010), determining the description of food in terms of its total 298 
composition, processing or origin is challenging, but there are a number of techniques that have 299 
been successful in verifying the authenticity of food. This includes stable isotope analysis, 300 
genomics and proteomics.  301 
In 2005 a code of practice was developed for the control of basmati rice sold in the UK (BRC, 302 
2005). If a product is identified as “basmati rice” then the non-basmati rice element cannot exceed 303 
7% of the packed product. It is difficult to differentiate between basmati and non-basmati grains 304 
based on visual test or physicochemical tests but research has been undertaken to identify 305 
adulteration of basmati rice as low as 1% in a sample through the use of tests that focus on variety-306 
specific allele profiles (Archak et al., 2007). In the Uonuma district of Japan, high quality rice has 307 
been bred with a specific genetic marker. The genetically distinctive rice sold under licence to 308 
Uonuma farmers will prevent inferior rice from being falsely sold under the district‟s name 309 
(Ravilious 2006; Kitaoka et al. 2010). Kitaoka et al. (2010) suggested that the method would be 310 
able to identify food from a particular location. This is also of importance when considering 311 
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provenance i.e. the country of origin or geographic indication claims associated with food products. 312 
Grundy et al. (2012) citing Kelly (2003) and Kelly and Bateman (2009) argue that analysis of stable 313 
isotopes in foods can reveal EMA such as addition of cheap sugar syrups to extend honey and 314 
maple syrup; watering down of wine; preparation of fruit juice described as “freshly squeezed” 315 
from concentrate; verification that chicken has been “corn-fed”; determination of whether ethanol 316 
and vinegar and flavorings are natural or synthetic; and differentiation between organic and 317 
conventional farming methods. All food and drink contains hydrogen and oxygen elements that 318 
originate from where the animal or plant received water from the local water sources. Both 319 
hydrogen and oxygen have heavy and light isotopes and the ratio of light to heavy isotopes is a 320 
unique marker for climate and geographical area. Carbon isotopes can be used to differentiate plant 321 
groups. Kelly et al. (2005) suggested that as a first approximation, natural abundance measurements 322 
would provide information on plant „type‟ or diet (carbon and nitrogen isotope ratios), and 323 
geographical origin (hydrogen, oxygen, sulphur and strontium isotope ratios). Therefore local 324 
agricultural practices and animal diet can affect 15N/14N and 13C/12C ratios respectively. Indeed, the 325 
geographic origin (rearing location) of animals used in meat production can be determined (Heaton 326 
et al. 2007). Beef reared in the US (n=23) and Brazil (n=10) was found to be isotopically diﬀ erent 327 
from northern European beef (n=35), mainly because of contrasting proportion of plants with C3 328 
and C4 photosynthetic pathways in the cattle diets (Schmidt et al., 2004). Isotopic maps of Europe 329 
are being developed so that prized, regional products such as Champagne, Gloucestershire cheese 330 
and Scottish salmon can be confidently matched with their places of origin (Ravilious 2006). More 331 
recent research has utilized stable isotope techniques in reviewing egg authentication schemes 332 
(Rock, 2012); geographic origin of beef (Liu et al.2013); and authenticity and quality of food of 333 
animal origin (Vinci et al. 2012). 334 
One of the drawbacks of using purely chemical analytical techniques in seeking to detect food 335 
adulteration is that as previously described there is a finite number of analytes that have been 336 
determined and thus methods developed to determine their presence/absence at a defined limit of 337 
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detection.  Utilising spectral or chromatographic techniques can identify patterns that can be 338 
compared with standards for unadulterated foods and anomalies to be identified even if the exact 339 
constituent that is causing the variability is unknown. However in some instances such as the 340 
adulteration of foods with Sudan 1 targeted analysis is required. This is true of spectral methods 341 
such as near infra-red spectroscopy (IR) and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). Fingerprinting 342 
refers to the spectrum or the image generated by certain analytical tools and the types of 343 
fingerprinting can be classified into three categories (Table 2):  spectral fingerprinting and 344 
chromatographic fingerprinting and electrophoresis fingerprinting (Zhang et al. 2011).  The use of 345 
such fingerprinting technology has seen the detection of source, materials and components in food 346 
such wines (Casale et al. 2010), cereals (Valeria et al. 2005) and fish protein (Hubert et al. 2008; 347 
Serge et al. 2007). Table 3 shows the application of the different kinds of food fingerprinting in 348 
food detection analysis.  349 
Take in Tables 2 and 3 350 
 351 
Additionally, DNA barcoding is a powerful method in determining morphologically unidentifiable 352 
fish or meat product samples as long as the DNA is preserved in the sample (Maralit et al. 2013). It 353 
is effective in determining the origin of raw materials and the detection of adulteration e.g. by 354 
mixing products from different taxonomy such as rice and ginseng (Galimberti et al. 2013: Niu et 355 
al. 2011). The primary goal of DNA barcoding is to assembly reference libraries of code sequences 356 
for known food species in order to develop reliable, molecular tools for identification (Hubert et al. 357 
2008). DNA tests, sequencing and databases can be developed for all meat types and will make it 358 
possible to trace the meat to the individual animal type, breed and locality of origin along with 359 
isotope analysis. In the UK, such tests are not part of routine surveillance and DNA sampling can 360 
cost £200 to £500 per food sample (Thomson 2013). This prohibits its use as an on-line quality 361 
assurance and process test method. Having outlined the role of both product verification activities 362 
what is the value of process verification in addressing EMA? 363 
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 364 
Process vs. Product verification 365 
Food standards assessment activities focus on both product and process verification. Process 366 
verification through the assessment of documentation, certification and traceability data is less 367 
costly than destructive product inspection and testing, but such verification rests on the ability to 368 
assess valid evidence in terms of documentation, records, labelling and evidence of certification.  369 
Fraud prevention and anti-counterfeiting tools can be used to track and trace movements of food 370 
products through the supply chain. Machine readable devices (barcodes, QR codes, data matrix) 371 
allow a number of checks to be enhanced and the electronic data can be shared (Dabbene, Gay and 372 
Tortia, 2013). Information shared between the different partners in the supply chain can decrease 373 
potential food frauds as the number of traceable units are documented and monitored for suspicious 374 
transactions.  375 
It is important that the traceable resource unit (TRU) or distinct batch must be uniquely identified 376 
(Moe, 1998 citing Kim et al., 1995). Over time, product traceability methods have been developed 377 
that are based on the ability to identify products uniquely as a result of physical marking on the 378 
product or its package or by the use of associated records (Moe, 1998). Moe argued that a 379 
traceability system could be split into two elements firstly the “route” of the product and the 380 
sequence of steps that it passes through so it is traceable through manufacturing, distribution and 381 
the retail system and the “scope” of the traceability in terms of the inherent nature of the product. 382 
This has been built on in more recent years with the introduction of “mass-balance” traceability 383 
checks for a TRU. Mass balance traceability is an essential pre-requisite within the food supply 384 
chain for assuring extrinsic quality. This process assures that identity preserved products are indeed 385 
what they purport to be. Mass balance checks routinely determine an organization‟s ability to 386 
identify, locate and “contain” a specific TRU of ingredient, part-processed or final product. The 387 
capacity to do this is critical in the event of a product withdrawal or a full product recall from the 388 
supply chain. It is also important to determine that the volume of product being sold as a specific 389 
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TRU where provenance, production method (organic, free range or Fairtrade) or cultural claim e.g. 390 
slaughter method (halal) and whether this could have indeed been produced in that quantity from 391 
the resources that were claimed to have originally been made available.  This is largely an 392 
electronic record and/or a paper-based exercise especially if the “stock” has left the production 393 
premises. This is problematical when the reliability and authenticity of data is subverted in the 394 
event of food fraud. Therefore process verification alone is of limited value in determining or 395 
identifying EMA. 396 
The UK Independent Farming Regulation Task Force in their 2011 report (IFRTF, 2011) 397 
recommended that industry engage “fully with Government and third party assurance bodies to 398 
develop a workable system of „earned recognition‟”. Third party certification schemes cover the 399 
certification of the management of the production, storage and handling of the products at a discrete 400 
point in the supply chain and are not, in the main, product specific certification schemes, although 401 
the generic product types are identified in the scope of certification for each organization. This 402 
means that in their current form, third party certification schemes have limited impact on the control 403 
of product verification only in as much as there was compliance with supply chain specifications on 404 
the day of the audit. This form of verification is more about the process and generic controls. 405 
Furthermore, verification of process and product through review and auditing provides the auditor 406 
with a range of evidence, or audit observations, which can be both qualitative e.g. interviews, 407 
observations and records or quantitative based on measurement and test. However, it is important to 408 
consider whether third party certification of organizations against management system standards 409 
can either guarantee increased compliance with statutory food standards product requirements or 410 
that such certification activities will address covert fraudulent behaviour which by its nature 411 
involves the falsification of product, labelling and/or documentation at one point or several points in 412 
the supply chain. If the records or labelling verified was: 413 
 falsified outside of the discrete bounds of the scope of the certification, and/or  414 
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 the processes being undertaken do not include re-confirmation of the validity of such 415 
documentation and labelling with the product batch delivered, and  416 
 there is no analytical or organoleptic evidence available of fraudulent activity when the 417 
product is being inspected, 418 
then the fraud will not be readily identified or prevented by this type of third party certification. 419 
Indeed, fraudulent behaviour, by its criminal nature, is unlikely to occur during a timetabled third 420 
party certification audit. The Elliott Review Interim Report (HM Government, 2013) suggests that 421 
the food industry moves to reducing the number of announced certification audits undertaken and 422 
replacing them with unannounced audits. However unless the certification standards contain 423 
specific elements that will be assessed with regard to EMA and food fraud this will have limited 424 
benefit.  The effectiveness of the certification activity depends upon the cooperation of the 425 
organization being audited, which in the event of criminal activity may well mean the auditor will 426 
face limited disclosure. It should also be considered that if an auditor discovers criminal activity 427 
during a certification audit, by the illegal nature of the issue the auditor‟s well-being and safety 428 
should be assured.  429 
The process sampling activities used within such certification audits are constrained by the time 430 
available, planned frequency of verification activities, volume of data to be assessed, any planned or 431 
unplanned sampling bias, and the potential for deviation from the scope of the audit (Manning, 432 
2013). Martz (2010) suggested that “evaluation myopia”, the inability of the auditor to identify side 433 
effects or side impacts due to the rigid application and non-reflective use of a certification standard 434 
or a “checklist” may also occur. This can lead to an auditor only verifying the effectiveness of the 435 
control of food safety and food management standards criteria that have been defined in the 436 
certification or audit standard or are already “known”. As already discussed the checklist does not 437 
implicitly address food standards, but instead focuses on food safety and food quality, then the 438 
potential for EMA, or its actual practice, might go unverified. The Elliott Report (HM Government, 439 
2013) recommends that third party accreditation bodies should collect and analyse food surveillance 440 
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samples as this would act as an additional deterrent to food businesses knowingly trading in 441 
fraudulent food. This has potential to address known types of fraudulent activity; however emerging 442 
hazards or “unknown unknowns” are outside the scope of a biannual or triennial updating of a 443 
certification scheme and associated product sampling so emerging issues cannot be addressed by 444 
this approach and still pose an issue unless regular revision activities take place within the 445 
certification body and by the “standard owner” e.g. the British Retail Consortium. Therefore this 446 
approach has limitations in addressing EMA and food criminality. 447 
 448 
Role of food policy in minimising food adulteration 449 
Food fraud that results in public health risk is often unknown until it is too late and the product is 450 
already in circulation and has potentially been ingested. Even then the illegal activity may only be 451 
identified by chance or as a result of a horizon scanning activity rather than from a formal risk-452 
based approach or an annual third party audit. Predicting types of adulterants and ways of 453 
manipulation can be carried out using the Rational Choice Theory (assuming rational choices by the 454 
fraudsters which may not be the case) or indeed in terms of food bioterrorism where irrational 455 
behaviour may well underpin the behaviours that occur. The CARVER + Shock tool is a food 456 
defensive tool to assess how vulnerable a food system or infrastructure is to an attack (Manning and 457 
Soon, 2013). It allows food regulators to think like the attackers. This methodology has led to the 458 
development of Vulnerability Assessment Software (VAS) tool (FDA, 2013a). This has been 459 
designed to be a prioritization tool that can be used to assess the vulnerabilities within a system or 460 
infrastructure in the food industry in order to build an effective food defense system. Carver + 461 
Shock and VAS tools focused on predicting attacks, but are not designed to assess vulnerabilities in 462 
the food supply chain for EMA issues. The attacker(s) of a food system ultimately wants to hurt 463 
consumers, cause economic losses and/or reputation and to generate chaos. It is carried out with the 464 
goal that the attack will be revealed within a period of time. Since food fraud or EMAs are carried 465 
out for economical gains, fraudsters will conceal their act in order to gain as much profit as 466 
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possible. Similar systems can be developed to assess the likelihood of food fraud or EMA occurring 467 
in the food chain. In this case, the critical points for food adulteration are points where fraudsters 468 
have the opportunity to use/substitute/addition different ingredients (i.e. agricultural/veterinary 469 
inputs / processing stage) and different packaging/labeling (i.e. at packaging or distribution stage) 470 
(Figure 1). In future, after incorporating food fraud methodology into certification standards, supply 471 
chain assurance and product verification, it may be equally difficult to remember a national or 472 
organizational food standards control programme without there being a food fraud preventive 473 
system in place as it would be now a food safety system without the use of HACCP plans (Spink 474 
and Moyer, 2013). The following section discusses the policy initiatives in the US, and UK/EU that 475 
address food adulteration including EMA. 476 
 477 
United States 478 
The US Federal Food and Drugs Act 1906 was introduced to prevent the manufacture, sale, or 479 
transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and 480 
liquors, and for regulating traffic therein (FDA, 2013b). The Meat Inspection Act (1906) was 481 
passed on the same day. This was superseded by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act 482 
of 1938, and then the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 483 
2002 with Section 302 specifically addressing protection against the adulteration of food (FDA, 484 
2013c). Section 302 gives high priority to increasing the number of inspections of food offered for 485 
import with the greatest priority given to inspections to detect intentional adulteration. The US 486 
passed the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) in January 2011. This is considered a landmark 487 
law that shifts the food safety focus from reactive to preventive thus more in line with the European 488 
approach. The FSMA addresses imported food safety under the Foreign Supplier Verification 489 
section where importers have the responsibility to verify inspection, testing and trace back systems 490 
(FDA 2013d). In the US, there are three main federal agencies that have primary responsibility for 491 
the safety of imported foods (Zach et al. 2012): 492 
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 Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 493 
 USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (USDA/FSIS); and  494 
 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 495 
Under the FSMA, these three agencies (CBP, FSIS, FDA) enforce, collaborate and communicate 496 
between each other to reduce the risk of unsafe food. 497 
 498 
United Kingdom / European Union 499 
The UK introduced the Preventing the Adulteration of Articles of Food or Drink Act into law in 500 
1860 and it was revised by the Adulteration of Food and Drugs Act 1872. This led to the formation 501 
of the Society of Public Analysts in 1874. The advent of the “due diligence” defense in the UK 502 
Food Safety Act 1990 meant that organizations had to then prove that they were proactive in 503 
ensuring the food they had been supplied was not injurious to health and was of the nature, 504 
substance and quality demanded by the purchaser. The legislation differentiated between food that 505 
was sold at retail stages that was “branded” or “own-label” i.e. sold under the retailers‟ brand. 506 
Under the Food Safety Act 1990, any supplier of a branded product was responsible for the safety 507 
of that product, and enforcement could be taken against a wholesaler or retailer even if the offense 508 
was caused by other parties in the food chain (Lee, 2006). Whilst major multiple food retailers in 509 
the UK gained commercial advantage from increased sales of own-branded food products, it also 510 
exposed them to greater risks in the event of product failure. This encouraged retailers to institute 511 
stringent private assurance programmes with their suppliers (Fearne, 1998). This so called “field to 512 
fork” or “plough to plate” approach led to systems that were complex and very costly elements of 513 
the procurement of own-label products (Henson and Northern, 1998). As a means to mitigate this 514 
cost the food retailers initiated the development of third-party inspection and then third-party 515 
certification of their suppliers, as previously described in this paper whilst still seeking to maintain 516 
an acceptable level of risk with regard to product failure in terms of their own verification activities. 517 
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European legislation (EC Regulation 178/2002) lays down the general principles and requirements 518 
of food law, the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and it also defined 519 
procedures in matters of food safety. Article 8 addresses protection of consumers' interests in the 520 
European Union (EU) and states that food law shall aim at the protection of the interests of 521 
consumers and “shall provide a basis for consumers to make informed choices in relation to the 522 
foods they consume. It shall aim at the prevention of: 523 
(a) fraudulent or deceptive practices; 524 
(b) the adulteration of food; and 525 
(c) any other practices which may mislead the consumer”. 526 
The requirements of Article 8 also differentiate between food safety and food standards criteria. 527 
This led onto the development of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) in Europe for 528 
identifying non-conformance within the MS. The Emerging Risk Exchange Network (EREN) is the 529 
principal body for exchanging information on emerging risks between the EFSA, MS, the EC and 530 
also international organisations. The network consists of national experts and allows information 531 
exchange through the facilitation of access to and exchange through sharing of databases (Randles, 532 
2012). In the UK, the intelligence from the EREN network along with data from other sources feeds 533 
into the Food Fraud Database. The data from these sources will feed into the predictive element of 534 
the systems to address EMA and food crime on a global scale, however localised EMA and food 535 
crime also needs to be considered. 536 
 537 
Developing a conceptual framework 538 
The conceptual framework developed as a result of this research focuses on the process of 539 
predicting, reacting and detecting economically and criminally food adulteration and builds on the 540 
work of Ribble et al. (2013) (Figure 1). At the beginning of the chain, integrity can be assured at a 541 
specific point that is before any potential attacks or substitution is possible. As the food and/or feed 542 
is utilized, produced or processed within the supply chain, or supply network, opportunities arise for 543 
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criminals and fraudsters to add/extract/substitute/mix/dilute the material with any substance that 544 
diminishes the integrity of such food. If EMAs were to take place at any point in the food chain, the 545 
food safety and food standards system relies solely upon the reaction / detection protocols and 546 
system that have been developed. These protocols and systems may work through a process of 547 
either passive or reactive surveillance activity. The use of supply chain intelligence needs to feed 548 
into these protocols to enhance their ability to react to potential attacks or to suspicion of EMA 549 
activity. Inspection protocols and product testing programmes are developed through a risk 550 
assessment process that might only be undertaken on an annual basis and such attacks may occur 551 
much more frequently. Further product testing has been focused historically on looking for specific 552 
“known” adulterants rather than determining the degree of product integrity. However as shown in 553 
Tables 2 and 3 fingerprinting technologies are developing and their more widespread use will assist 554 
to determine product integrity. Furthermore compliance, or not, with an integrity fingerprint does 555 
not require the test to determine the actual agent used in an EMA, just that an attack has taken place 556 
and that product integrity is now uncertain. If the food adulterant manages to bypass passive 557 
mechanisms of control, the adulterated food may ultimately cause acute or chronic illness in the 558 
population or the concern over such illness cause substantial economic loss. 559 
Concurrent risk assessment studies on economic and social factors (e.g. pressure on food prices, 560 
animal disease outbreaks, or weather events causing crop loss) together with associated predictive 561 
modeling can be utilized to predict the potential for EMA and wider food crime. Policy measures 562 
introduced require the implementation of both predictive measures and also reaction and detection 563 
methods.   564 
Take in Figure 1 565 
Prediction of food adulteration rests upon the appropriate analysis of intelligence through the use of 566 
predictive tools and expert knowledge. Cassidy and Buede (2009) argued that expert accuracy is, in 567 
general, no better than that achieved by chance as increased experience is often accompanied by an 568 
unjustified increase in self-confidence. They assert that there is a strong general tendency for 569 
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overconfidence when making predictions or statements of uncertainty, i.e. the predicted probability 570 
of an event is often not calibrated with its actual likelihood of occurring based on the work of 571 
Koehler et al. (2002), Yates et al. (1998) and Litchtenstein et al. (1982). Whilst this research was 572 
looking at the ability to determine risk associated with issues such as whether it could be suggested 573 
that this factor of expert accuracy is the same when qualitatively, or semi-qualitatively determining 574 
the risk associated with food adulteration or food crime too. Koehler et al., (2002) identified five 575 
areas for calibrating expert judgment: 576 
 Overprediction: always assigning probabilities that are high; 577 
 Underprediction: Always assigning probabilities that are low 578 
 Overextremity: overestimating high probabilities and underestimating low probabilities 579 
 Underextremity: Underestimating high probabilities and overestimating low probabilities 580 
and  581 
 Overconfidence: being either overprediction or overextremity. 582 
Angner (2006) in his work on overconfidence with economic experts highlighted that 583 
overconfidence increases with difficulty i.e. the more unknown a factor the more likely that 584 
overconfidence occurs. Whilst this may in part lie within the requirements of the precautionary 585 
principle associated with European food policy there is potential concern when considering EMA 586 
and food fraud that the expert assessment will be incorrect and then the resultant decision on the 587 
actions to take. Anger (2006) further argues that in their role as “experts”, individuals may not 588 
receive adequate outcome feedback i.e. they will never know what would have happened in the 589 
absence of the implementation of their recommendations. It is equally important that the actual 590 
outcomes of the implementation of their advice is fed back into the expert analysis of the future. 591 
However it is important in this case in hindsight not to exaggerate the predictability of past events.  592 
Therefore, how can the bias of overconfidence be mitigated in frameworks such as Figure 1? 593 
Angner (2006) suggests: 594 
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 Accepting that overconfidence will occur and if possible eliminating it over time by 595 
requiring experts to give arguments against their view and the reasons why they may be 596 
wrong and providing feedback on decisions that is frequent, prompt, and unambiguous; 597 
 Require clarity in predictions and decisions so that they are not ambiguous and ensure 598 
predictions are on the public record; and 599 
 Minimise interpersonal differences between experts. 600 
In predicting EMA and food crime it is important to consider the contributing factors that influence 601 
the incidence of food crime such as the motive, ability to detect the adulterant (known/unknown) 602 
the ability of the fraudster/criminal to cheat existing analytical tests, the strength of regulatory and 603 
market controls at the point of adulteration/criminal activity and at the point of consumption, the 604 
economic or supply chain factors (pressure on food prices, factors impacting on balance between 605 
supply and demand) and the complexity of supply chain and  the influence of cross-border activity.  606 
Databases and risk assessment measures as well as predictive modelling and intelligence gathering 607 
will be undertaken in order to identify the potential for EMA and food crime. Reaction and 608 
detection measures will depend on the agents of adulteration/substitution and the type of food fraud. 609 
Table 1 identified seven different types of food fraud and the reaction/detection measures will vary. 610 
 611 
Conclusion 612 
 Activities to predict the potential for adulteration or even bioterrorism have an inbuilt weakness 613 
because the quantification of risk is usually based on historical data that may, or may not be 614 
available or may/may not reflect the actual risk now at any given time in the future. Food fraud that 615 
results in public health risk is often unknown until it is too late and may only be identified by 616 
chance rather than from a formal risk-based approach; however there is a need to develop such 617 
predictive models for the future.  618 
Historically, analytical screening techniques were used to identify EMA, and wider food crime, but 619 
this is only of value if the nature of the adulterant is known. There are evolving food forensics 620 
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techniques that will be able to determine food integrity through techniques such as isotope analysis 621 
or spectroscopy that do not require the contaminant to be known rather that food integrity or purity, 622 
to the level of detection, cannot be shown. This investigative framework is valuable as a means to 623 
fight food fraud/EMA. However, these tests are costly and will by and large, in the short term 624 
anyway, be used as a tool of verification and not as a form of analysis for routine batch release. 625 
Therefore they cannot be used as either a preventative control, or an on-line, real-time monitoring 626 
activity within an established quality plan. 627 
The objective of this study was to explore the current strategies available to monitor and detect the 628 
EMA and their relative strengths and weaknesses and recommend new approaches and policies to 629 
strengthen future capabilities to counter adulteration in a globalized food environment. The 630 
conceptual framework developed in this research focused on the process of predicting, reacting and 631 
detecting economically and criminally food adulteration, with specific emphasis on calibrating the 632 
confidence of experts as this underpins the horizon scanning, risk assessment and predictive 633 
processes as well as informing the requirements to ensure effective reactions and detections are 634 
undertaken. 635 
  636 
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 983 
Table 1: Types of food fraud (Adapted from Spink and Moyer, 2011) 984 
Type Definition 
Adulteration A component of the finished product is fraudulent 
Counterfeit All aspects of the fraudulent product and packaging are fully replicated 
Diversion The sale or distribution of legitimate products outside of intended markets 
Over-run Legitimate product is made in excess of production agreements 
Simulation Illegitimate product is designed to look like but does not exactly copy the legitimate 
product 
Tampering Legitimate product and packaging are used in a fraudulent way 
Theft Legitimate product is stolen and passed off as legitimately procured 
 985 
Table 2: Classification of fingerprinting technologies (Adapted from Zhang et al.2011) 986 
 987 
Methods Electrophoresis fingerprinting Spectral 
fingerprinting 
Chromatographic 
fingerprinting 
Biochemical 
fingerprinting 
Protein 
electrophoresis, 
isoenzyme 
electrophoresis 
  DNA 
fingerprinting 
 
Restriction fragment 
length polymorphism 
(RFLP)  
 
Random Amplified 
Polymorphic DNA 
(RAPD) 
 
Amplified Fragment 
Length 
Polymorphism 
(AFLP) 
 
Pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis 
(PFGE)  
Nuclear Magnetic 
Resonance (NMR),   
Infrared (IR) 
 
Ultraviolet and 
visible 
spectroscopy (UV) 
 
Mass spectrometry 
(MS) 
Gas chromatography 
(GC) 
 
High performance liquid 
chromatography 
(HPLC) 
 988 
  989 
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Table 3: Application fields of fingerprinting in food detection (adapted from Charlton, 2010; 990 
Niuet al., 2011; Sefcet al. 2000; Woolfe and Primrose 2004; Zhang et al. 2011) 991 
 992 
Application domain Products Detection indicators Detection Technology 
Origin Tea, beer, mutton, 
olive oil, wine 
Microelements, water, 
lipid, protein, 
carbohydrate, aromatic 
compound, isotope 
indicators 
NMR, IR, PCR 
Material/species Bird‟s nest, aquatic 
product, poultry, 
vegetables, Basmati 
rice, Genseng 
Protein, DNA SDS-PAGE, 
Isoenzyme 
electrophoresis, RFLP, 
RAPD, AFLP, small 
sequence length 
polymorphism 
(SSLPs) 
Component Milk, fruit, edible oil, 
tea, beef, ham, health 
products 
Protein, lipid, lecithin, 
vitamins, sugars, 
organic acid,  
SDS-PAGE, NMR, IR, 
UV, MS 
Additive Meat, milk, juice, 
processed food, 
carbonated beverages, 
ice-cream 
Nitrite, sufan, 
melamine, clebuterol 
hydrochloride, 
colorants, antiseptic 
UV, GC, LC, MS 
Objectionable 
constituent in 
processing 
Fried starch products, 
margarine, barbeque 
Acrylamide, trans-fatty 
acids, benzopyrene 
UV, GC, LC, MS 
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React / Detect Predicting EMA and food crime 
Product recall; fines; licenses’ revoked; jail terms; company temporary / permanent closure; death 
penalty (e.g. China’s melamine case) 
Active laboratory surveillance for adulterants in feed, 
environment, primary food products and processed 
food products for known agents 
Passive laboratory surveillance of 
animal health and wellbeing (agents 
contained within adulterated feed)  
Cluster Outbreak 
Databases and risk assessment measures 
RASFF / VAS tool / CNCFSRA 
Horizon scanning activities;  
Multidisciplinary expert panels or think tanks and degree of 
accuracy of expert knowledge – mitigation of overconfidence;  
Earliest time before food and feed is adulterated 
i.e. when integrity can be assured 
Contributing factors 
Motive (rational/irrational – terrorism etc) 
Ability to detect adulterant (known/unknown) 
Ability to cheat existing analytical tests 
Strength of regulatory and market controls at point of 
adulteration/criminal activity and at point of consumption 
Economic or supply chain factors (pressure on food prices, 
factors impacting on balance between supply and demand) 
Complexity of supply chain and influence of cross-border activity 
 
Case 
Inspections; sampling; product testing, development of new 
methodologies when potential EMA or other agents identified 
Animal 
feed / 
plant 
nutrient 
Primary 
production 
Food 
Processing  
Food 
storage / 
distribution 
Clinical; syndromic; mandatory 
notifications 
Predictive modeling/intelligence gathering such as the FFD; 
Outcome feedback from the react/detection phase  
Media and social network surveillance; 
Criminal and industry intelligence 
Monitoring of unusual over-the-counter drug sales or chemical 
sales; 
Unusual spike in sick animals 
Economic trends 
Figure 1. Predictive and reactive systems for food adulteration – role of food policy and risk assessment centres (adapted from Ribble et al. 2013) (Note: RASFF: 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed; VAS – Vulnerability Assessment Software; FFD – Food Fraud Database; CNCFSRA: China National Center for Food Safety 
Risk Assessment)  
Food chain 
Detection of food adulteration 
incidents through laboratory 
surveillance and inspections and 
notifications from health centers 
Severity of penalties increase 
